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Abstract
The European Commission recently endorsed a future company tax policy
that would allow companies to consolidate their tax bases and apportion the
income across the EU using an allocation mechanism. This policy would
replace the separate accounting method with formula apportionment of EU
group profits as the main method of taxing multinational companies in the
European Union.  However, many details of the approaches remain to be
presented, and these details may turn what appears to be a simple solution
into an extremely complex one. This paper explores some technical details
that arise in adopting formula apportionment in the European Union.
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On October 23, 2001, the European Commission set forth a broad strategy for future
company tax policy in the European Union.
1 As foreshadowed in its May
Communication, the Commission’s company tax study endorses a fundamental long-
term reform of EU company tax policy. The Commission study states that in the
future companies should be able to achieve a consolidated corporate tax base with
cross border loss relief under a single set of tax rules for their EU activities.  This
consolidated tax base would be distributed across EU member states using a
commonly agreed allocation mechanism. Thus, the possibility that the European
Union might move to formula apportionment is no longer an abstract, academic idea.
The Study notes that these comprehensive approaches would solve a majority of the
tax obstacles facing EU businesses in a “single stroke.” However, many details of the
approaches remain to be presented, and these details may turn what appears to be a
simple solution into an extremely complex one.  Thus, while in theory, formula
apportionment in the EU may be a dream come true, in practice, formula
apportionment may be the EU’s worst nightmare.
2  This paper will explore some of
these details to help evaluate whether formula apportionment in the EU would be a
taxpayer’s dream come true of the EU’s worst nightmare.
FORMULA APPORTIONMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION…
…  AN EU TAXPAYER’S DREAM COME TRUE …
In recent years, some EU businesses have highlighted several tax obstacles in the EU
that prevent them from operating on a basis consistent with the Single Market.
UNICE, for example, has argued that “the continued existence of major tax obstacles
to cross-border economic activity is incompatible with the notion of a single market.
3”
Unless these tax obstacles are eliminated, UNICE notes, EU businesses may not
organize their operations on the most efficient basis, to the detriment of growth and
employment in the EU.  The advent of EMU and the pursuit of the four fundamental
freedoms of the EU treaty makes it urgent that the taxation of EU companies be
consistent with the Single Market.
UNICE has listed a number of key tax obstacles they face when doing business in
more than one EU Member State. These obstacles are encapsulated by the existence
of 15 different company tax systems and the 15 different sets of rules, regulations, and
legislation in the European Union.  Other obstacles include the requirement to find
transfer prices for complex internal cross-border transactions; the failure to provide
                                                
1   See Commission of the European Communities “Towards and Internal Market without tax
obstacles” COM(2001) 582 final and “Company Taxation in the Internal Market” SEC(2001) 1681, 23
October 2001.  For a summary and analysis of these documents, see Weiner (2001b). For an evaluation
of a broad range of issues that would be involved in adopting formula apportionment at the
international perspective, see the conference paper by Weiner  (1999).   For a report on the U.S.
Treasury Department conference on formula apportionment, see Tax Notes Int’l, 23 December 1996.
2  The author addressed many of these issues in Weiner (2001a).  See also McLure and  Weiner (2000).
This article will focus in greater detail a few issues to highlight the complex issues involved.
3 Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe, “Memorandum on cross-border
company taxation obstacles in the single market,”  3 April 2000.Page 3
for cross-border loss offset in the EU; and the tax costs that arise when businesses
restructure across borders.  UNICE noted that the “essential component” of an
optional European system of company taxation would be an EU-wide taxable base.
By providing for a single --- optional --- consolidated income tax base for EU-wide
activities, a comprehensive solution to the EU tax problem would solve many of these
problems.
4 Transfer pricing and cost allocation within a group would no longer be
necessary.  The distinction between branches and subsidiaries would no longer be
relevant for tax purposes.  Cross-border mergers could be made without incurring any
tax consequences.  Most importantly, cross-border loss offset would automatically
occur.
5  Thus, the system may be an EU multinational taxpayer’s dream come true, as
it appears to solve all of these issues at once. 
… OR THE EU’S WORST NIGHTMARE?
The devil may be in the details that remain to be defined. The Commission presented
four comprehensive methods for the long-term future EU company tax policy, all of
which would use formula apportionment instead of the arm’s length/separate
accounting method now employed in all of the Member States.
6  However, none of
those proposals was described fully, leaving many key elements to be defined later.
This paper addresses some of these deferred issues by focussing on a few specific
issues: distortions that arise when using formula apportionment and consolidated (or
unitary) taxation, the definition of the consolidated group, and the treatment of
income and operations located outside the European Union.
 
Distortions caused by using a formula apportionment system
At the outset, it should be recognized that formula apportionment only provides an
estimate of the geographic source of income.  As has long been recognized in the U.S.
states, formula apportionment does not attempt to identify the precise geographic
source of a company’s profits, but only to provide “a rough approximation of a
corporation’s income that is reasonably related to the actual profits earned within a
State.”  Multistate companies accept these rough approximates within the U.S. states,
where corporate tax rates are relatively low and exhibit relatively little cross-state
variation. However, these rough approximations might not be acceptable within the
EU, where company tax rates are relatively high and exhibit relatively wide cross-
country variation. 
One key distortion arises through the interaction of the formula with the statutory tax
rate and the firm’s factor choices. McLure (1980) was one of the first to take a close
look at how the system of apportionment used in the states affects business decisions.
                                                
4  UNICE notes that the system should be optional because not all companies are so integrated that they
need a European system.  Once a company chose the EU system, that choice would be irreversible.
5  The Commission’s Study presents an example provided by UNICE where one of its companies
would have saved 320 m. ECU over a 3-year-period if it had been able to use its losses of  880 m. ECU
in some member states to offset profits of 870 m. ECU in other member states (p. 253).
6 There is a wide body of literature analyzing the strengths and benefits of both the arm’s length
approach and formula apportionment.  See McDaniel (1994, 2000), Musgrave (2000), and
McLure/Weiner (2000), among others.  Ten years ago, the author presented a paper suggesting formula
apportionment for the European Community; see  Weiner (1991).  See Amerkhail (2000) for an
interesting proposal to combine the best of  both systems.Page 4
His pioneering work showed that by using a formula to determine state income, the
states effectively transformed the formula into a direct tax on whatever factors are
included in the formula. 
If profits are apportioned to locations according to firm-specific factors, rather than
according to factors that are exogenous to the firm’s choices, then formula
apportionment introduces an additional distortion to the investment decision. This
distortion arises because the effective tax rate under apportionment equals not only
the direct effect caused by the taxation of capital but also the indirect effect caused by
the use of an endogenous factor to allocate profits.  This indirect effect can be positive
or negative, depending on the relationship between the tax rate in any particular
location and the weighted average tax rate over all locations.
7  Thus, apportionment
can create an additional ‘tax’ or a ‘subsidy’ to new investment, with that tax distortion
depending, in part, on the distribution of the factors across locations. 
For example, with a formula that apportions income according to the location of
capital, the marginal effective tax rate (METR) on capital equals the difference
between the state’s apportionment-weighted statutory tax rate and the apportionment-
weighted average tax rate over all other states. Weiner (1994) calculated these
apportionment-adjusted state tax rates and found that the cross-state variation in ETRs
(taking into account the formula, federal deductibility, and various other state specific
parameters) was not large enough to have a measurable impact on cross-state
industrial structure.
With relatively low maximum statutory tax rates and a floor of no taxation, the range
of variation in state METRs is limited to a few percentage points and may not have
much influence on investment and employment. However, in the EU, where the
variation in statutory tax rates ranges from 10 percent to over 40 percent, the range of
variation in EU METRs under apportionment could reach double digits. Thus, the
formula might have a more noticeable impact on business investment decisions in the
European Union than has been the case in the U.S. states.
The traditional formula that includes property and payroll creates another distortion
separate from the impact on investment and employment.  In this case, because the tax
rate is endogenous to the firm’s factor choices, the formula will be unstable as states
have an incentive to manipulate the formula to stimulate additional investment or
employment.  For example, a state can reduce the weight on property (capital) and
payroll (labor) and increase the weight on sales to encourage inward investment and
employment.  Experience in the U.S. states shows that many states are pursuing this
policy, with nearly half of the states now using a double-weighted sales factor formula
(instead of the equally-weighted three factor formula), up from just a handful of states
two decades earlier.  Empirical evidence suggests that these policies are successful in
stimulating new investment, at least until other states adopt the same formula (see
Gupta and Hoffman, 2000).
Cross-border loss compensation and consolidation
                                                
7   For an example that addresses two ideas in the Commission’s study, see Mintz and Weiner (2001).Page 5
A key objective of EU businesses is obtaining cross-border loss offsetting. The
Commission welcomed the Ruding Committee’s recommendation that Member States
adopt the draft directive dealing with losses of permanent establishments and
subsidiaries in another Member State.
8  However, the work has not progressed
because a “vast majority” of Member States would like to limit the scope of the
directive to losses of permanent establishments. There was no follow-up to the
Ruding Committee’s recommendation that Member States allow full vertical and
horizontal loss offset domestically to be followed by full Community-wide loss
offsetting within groups of enterprises.
As Denmark is one of the two Member States allowing foreign subsidiaries to be
included in the corporate group, the Commission highlights the Danish “joint
taxation” system as providing a “promising way forward” in terms of defining an EU
loss offset scheme.
9  Even this scheme, however, imposes several restrictions and
would not necessarily provide the loss offset that EU companies desire.  For example,
the Danish system applies only to wholly-owned subsidiaries, all companies included
in the group must have the same taxable year, shares in the subsidiaries must have
been owned for the entire year, and foreign subsidiaries will not be allowed to be
included in the group if more than half of their share capital has been acquired from
related companies.
The Study acknowledges the difficulties in defining a consolidated group across the
EU.  The internal legislation of Member States varies widely concerning the
ownership requirements necessary to obtain domestic loss compensation.  These
thresholds range from 51 percent in Germany, 75 percent in Austria, Ireland, and the
UK, 90 percent in Sweden, Finland, Portugal and Spain, 95 percent in France, 99
percent in Luxembourg and the Netherlands, to 100 percent ownership in Denmark.
Three members do not allow group consolidation under domestic law and only two
member extend cross-border consolidation to foreign subsidiaries.
One EU Member State has experience with the complications that may arise when
considering how to determine the group. Germany allows consolidation for corporate
income tax purposes and for trade tax purposes. However, the Tax Reduction Act of
2000 created a situation where the consolidation rules for the corporate income tax
differed from those for the trade tax.  Evan after a correction that was to occur in the
Business Taxation Amendment Act, it may still be possible to employ certain
techniques to achieve consolidation for purposes of one tax and not the other.
10 This
example points to a difficulty in defining the consolidated group. 
Tax planning under consolidated base taxation with formula apportionment
Although it is often stated that tax planning will no longer be possible with
consolidated base taxation and formula apportionment, the experience in the U.S.
                                                
8  See “Proposal for a Council Directive concerning arrangements for the taking into account by
enterprises of the losses of their permanent establishments and subsidiaries situated in other Member
States (COM (90) 595), see O.J. C 53, 28 February 1991, p. 30.
9  Commission Study (2001), p. 342.
10 For details, see Ehlermann and Kowallik (2001).Page 6
states shows that tax planning still occurs.  Companies doing business in several U.S.
states can employ a variety of techniques to minimize their tax liabilities.
11
All else equal, consolidation is beneficial in cases where it would allow losses in one
operation to be offset against profits in another operation so as to reduce the entity’s
total tax liability.  This is the basic benefit that EU businesses argue should be
available in the Internal Market.  However, consolidation with formula apportionment
would also allow companies to shift income from high tax locations to low tax
locations if apportionment results in a greater share of the entities’ total income being
assigned to the low tax state as a result of consolidation than under the separate
approach.  
This impact of consolidated base taxation with formula apportionment is often not
appreciated.  This outcome occurs because under apportionment, not only is the
income combined within the group but also the elements making up the
apportionment factors.  Thus, even if the tax base is smaller due to loss offsetting, the
share of income apportioned might rise, depending on the distribution of the
apportionment factors among the relevant locations, making the overall impact
ambiguous.
Should a taxpayer wish to avoid any resulting increase in tax burden that might result
from consolidating these operations, the taxpayer could take a subsidiary out of the
consolidated group.  Suppose, for example, the EU adopts the Danish definition of a
corporate group under which only wholly owned subsidiaries are included in the
group. If the parent company wished to remove an entity from the group, it would
merely need to reduce its ownership share by a small percentage. 
Likewise, the parent company could bring an entity into the group by increasing its
ownership percentage up to the threshold required for consolidation.  A taxpayer may
consider employing this strategy during a period in which one of its entities was
incurring losses due to the expenses associated with its start up.  It could then dilute
its ownership share at a point when the tax costs made it worthwhile to do so. Thus,
this situation might lead companies to “fracture their identities in a corporate shell
game” to avoid taxation.
12
Furthermore, if these entities were still related to the parent, even though they were
not technically considered part of the consolidated group, the parent company could
employ transfer pricing techniques to shift income out of the group.  Thus, transfer
pricing remains an issue even under consolidated base taxation.  The upshot of these
arguments is that a system of consolidation with apportionment can lead to a situation
where companies selectively alter their corporate structure for tax purposes.  
Reducing these tax planning opportunities is one reason that many states have turned
to the unitary tax method.  Under the unitary tax, the economically integrated
operations of a business are combined, regardless of the legal ownership.  Imposing
                                                
11  For a general discussion of these opportunities, see Healy (2001).
12 The U.S. Supreme Court made this argument when it rejected the bright-line unitary test in Allied-
Signal (1992). Allied-Signal Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992) and Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Vermont, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).  Of course, U.S. constitutional issues have no legal force in EU
law; however, the line of reasoning can help establish the contours of an EU apportionment system.Page 7
this restriction curbs the ability of taxpayers to engage in the tax planning strategies
described above, but still does not eliminate them.  Moreover, there is no simple way
to define a unitary business, and the U.S. states, more than half of which have adopted
the unitary approach, use a range of different definitions. 
As the European Commission has now endorsed the idea of formula apportionment in
the European Union, it is appropriate to examine some key technical issues that
should be resolved when designing an apportionment system. This analysis will focus
on how to define the consolidated, or unitary, group and how to treat non-EU income.
Unitary taxation
Determining the contours of the group to be combined is a central issue in adopting
any form of group taxation within the EU.
13  There are many ways to define this
group, ranging from a test based solely on ownership to tests that look at the
connection of the operation to the parent company. It has been difficult to reach a
common definition in the states since there many ways to define a consolidated
business. Accurately defining the composition of the group is especially crucial to
minimize tax planning opportunities.
14 
The “unitary tax” describes the broad notion of the taxable group under consideration
in the Commission study.  Under unitary taxation, or unitary combination as it is also
known, members of an affiliated group of companies that are part of an economically
integrated group are combined and treated as a single entity for tax purposes.  Thus,
the unitary tax recognizes that it is logical to treat a highly-integrated company as a
single operation even though that group may be composed of legally separate entities. 
A simple way to define a consolidated business would be to combine all affiliates that
exceed a certain ownership threshold.  Corrigan (1980) proposed that that any
business that was more than 50 percent owned by another, i.e., it was controlled by
the other company, would be considered part of the consolidated business. This idea
is appealing primarily for its administrative simplicity. However, such a bright line
test might be easily circumvented, as a company could reduce its legal ownership
below 50 percent but still retain effective control of the entity. Companies might, thus,
arrange their corporate structure for tax, rather than business, purposes. A test based
on ownership could also lead to different lines of business being combined and
apportioned using one formula, even if it might be more appropriate for the different
lines of business to use different formulas.
A test based on control would be broader than the ownership ship as it would look not
only to whether the parent company had legal control through ownership of a majority
of voting rights, but also to whether it had effective control through ownership of a
large minority interest. In general, control may exist if the parent entity has the ability
                                                
13  All of the proposals allow for consolidation, although not unitary taxation.  Nevertheless, many of
the arguments that apply in determining the unitary group also apply in determining which entities to
consolidate in the common group.
14  See Mintz and Smart (2001) for evidence that Canadian companies that operate as related companies
in several jurisdictions but do not allocate income using formula apportionment have a much higher
elasticity of the corporate income tax base with respect to changes in corporate income tax rates
compared to companies that must allocate income across provincial jurisdictions..Page 8
to influence its affiliates to reach its own objectives even if the parent entity does not
own a majority of the voting rights.
Another definition looks at several facts. An early definitions of a unitary business
arose in California with the “three unities” test.  Under this test, a business is unitary
if there is (1) unity of ownership; (2) unity of operations as evidenced by central
purchasing, advertising, accounting and management divisions, and (3) unity of use in
its centralized executive force and general system of operation.
A related notion of unitary is the “dependency or contribution” test, which was
developed by Altman and Keesling (1946).  Under this test, a business will be unitary
if the operation of the business within the state depends on or contributes to the
operation of a business outside of the state.”
Apart from a test based solely on ownership, all definitions of a unitary group require
some sort of evaluation of the relationship between the parent company and its
affiliates.  If there is an “exchange of value” as shown by functional integration,
centralization of management, and economies of scale, for example, then it is likely
that the business is unitary and can be consolidated.  However, each of these factors
requires making a judgment.
Many other definitions of a unitary business are possible, and the U.S. states are far
from uniform in how they define a unitary business. As the U.S. Supreme Court has
noted: “A final point that needs to be made about the unitary business concept is that
it is not, so to speak, unitary: there are variations on the theme, and any number of
them are logically consistent with the underlying principles motivating the
approach.
15” 
The EU Study does not explicitly evaluate the unitary method. However, the Study
does find that “it would seem that for the EU to adopt formula apportionment and/or
unitary combination it would require a substantial conformity of definitions of tax
bases, apportionment formulae, measures of apportionment factors, and unitary
businesses.” 
 
Issues concerning operations outside of the European Union
The treatment of income and operations outside of the European Union should also be
addressed.  At present, the comprehensive solutions appear to be limited to the
European Union Water’s Edge (EUWE).  However, imposing an EUWE limitation
effectively means that two systems will need to be maintained:  apportionment for
internal EU income and operations and separate accounting for income and operations
outside of the European Union.  
This issue is not trivial, as a significant number of transactions among multinationals
in Europe occur with non-EU parent companies or subsidiaries. For example, the
fastest growth in mergers and acquisition activity in the EU is occurring between EU
and non-EU companies.  Much of this activity is occurring with US companies,
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acquisitions of which accounted for more than 40 percent of total outward direct
investment from the EU in 1998.  Thus, regardless of any desire to restrict the system
to the EU, any comprehensive solution must find a way to deal with these non-EU
matters.  As presently discussed, the consolidated tax base will be defined as “EU
income” making it necessary to find ways to protect that tax base from being shifted
outside of the European Union.
To identify some of the problems that might arise, this section discusses the treatment
of foreign-source dividends.  Dividends received from outside the EU water’s edge
group  could be treated as taxable income (under worldwide combined reporting,
similar to consolidation, such dividends would be netted out as intercompany
payments).  This practice would mean that the dividend income would be treated as
taxable income, but the factors that generated that income would not be reflected in
the apportionment factors (since the entity was not part of the water'’ edge group).
This issue has been extremely controversial in the states and has led to many
alternative means for providing for "factor representation” of such payments.
In the states, these arguments have centered on whether the dividends should be
considered as “foreign source” and thus excluded from the water’s edge report or
whether they were part of consolidated business income and thus included in the
water’s edge group.  This issue was debated at length by the Treasury Department’s
Worldwide Unitary Tax Working Group where the views were represented by three
groups: purely domestic, U.S.-based multinationals, and foreign-based
multinationals.
16  At that time, U.S.-based multinationals argued that if they pay tax
on these dividends, while foreign-based companies are exempt, they will be at a
competitive disadvantage with their multinational competitors.  By contrast, purely
domestic companies countered that exempting all foreign-source dividends would put
them at a competitive disadvantage relative to multinational companies.  In the end,
the Working Group was not able to resolve this issue.
This issue continues to remain an unsettled aspect of state practice. States could
exempt foreign-source dividends, which would essentially be taxing on a territorial
basis.
17  If the company financed its foreign operations with debt, however, additional
rules would be necessary to prevent companies from allocating expenses to foreign-
source income without providing for a matching taxation of that income when it was
received.  Most international tax laws disallow deductions for expenses incurred to
earn tax exempt income.  
States could also treat foreign-source and domestic-source dividends identically,
either by exempting both (or giving the same deduction) or by denying the dividends-
received deduction for all dividends. Worldwide combined reporting, which
eliminates intercompany dividend payments from the combined report is another
method that treats foreign- and domestic-source dividends identically.
It is also possible to match the dividend payments with the factors, as occurs under the
“Detroit” method of factor representation.  This method includes the dividends in the
                                                
16 See Final Report of the Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group, US Treasury (1984).
17  For a detailed analysis of this issue, see McLure (1986).Page 10
tax base and adjusting the denominators of the parent company’s factors by the ratio
of net dividends received to the dividend-paying subsidiaries’ net profits. 
Worldwide unitary taxation?
Some have noted that the only solution to this problem is to adopt worldwide unitary
combination.  In this manner, all of the unitary operations of the EU business would
be combined into a single tax base and the need to draw an artificial line between EU
and non-EU income would be eliminated.  
The EU could adopt this method with respect to EU-based parent companies.  Given
the sustained controversy over the this method when applied to foreign-based parent
companies in the U.S. states, however, it is not likely that the EU would propose such
a move in the near future.  In its consideration of the constitutionality of applying the
worldwide unitary tax on a foreign-based parent, for example, the U.S Supreme Court
noted in Barclay’s Bank v. California that a “battalion of foreign governments” had
“marched to Barclays” aid, deploring worldwide combined reporting in diplomatic
notes, amicus brief, and even retaliatory legislation.
18”  Nearly two dozen major
countries filed briefs in support of Barclays and deploring the method of assessing the
state worldwide unitary tax on foreign-based parent companies and all of their
worldwide affiliates, among others, as being incompatible with accepted international
principles of corporate taxation.
None of the above issues is insurmountable.  However, these difficulties illustrate that
the tax authorities will have to maintain their expertise in enforcing the arm’s length
system while also increasing their cooperative efforts with other tax authorities and
implementing a series of anti-abuse measures under a system of consolidated base
taxation. 
CONCLUSION
The European Commission has taken a bold step toward fundamental company tax
reform in the European Union.  By setting forth a strategy providing for consolidated
base taxation with formula apportionment within the European Union, the
Commission has thrust a once taboo issue to the top of EU policy makers’ agendas.  
This proposal may fulfill many dreams of EU businesses.  In general, allowing
companies to consolidate their EU activities under a single corporate tax base means
that EU companies will no longer have to establish transfer prices for internal
transfers within the EU, losses incurred by an affiliate in one member state will
automatically be offset against profits earned in another member state, the tax
consequences of cross-border restructurings within the consolidated group will be
simplified, and companies doing business in several EU member states will have to
contend with just a single company tax system.  
                                                
18   The Court ruled in favor of California.  See  Barclays Bank v. California Franchise Tax Board, 114
U.S. 2268 (1994).Page 11
A decade ago, many might have feared that moving to formula apportionment in the
European Union would be a nightmare. As shown by the experiences in several
countries that use the method at the subnational level, formula apportionment creates
significant distortions and has its own drawbacks.  Should a group of countries decide
to adopt formula apportionment, it must find a way to agree on the definition of the
common tax base, the composition of the taxable corporate group, and on the formula
used to apportion profits within the defined area.  Member States must reconcile
divergent tax claims that will arise from the interaction of the new system with the
separate accounts method used in other countries.  Moreover tax authorities will have
to maintain expertise in both systems and companies will still have to use the current
system for transactions outside the EU. 
Given the incomplete economic integration in the European Union, the time may not
yet be ripe for formula apportionment.  As explained in his consideration of European
company tax policy,  Sijbren Cnossen (2001) concluded that, “At present, formula
apportionment seems a bridge too far.”  Based on the state of current economic and
political integration within the EU, that conclusion may currently hold.  However,
these issues, while difficult, can be overcome as there are several countries that have
used formula apportionment for decades. The answer to whether formula
apportionment in the EU is a “dream come true” or the “EU’s worst nightmare” is
likely to be --- it is both.Page 12
ANNEX
A THOUGHT FOR THE FUTURE
This section presents some thoughts for the future that might affect the development
of company tax policy in the European Union. The first policy concerns a recurrent
idea to treat the European Union (or Community) as a single country for US tax
purposes, a notion first raised in the early 1960s following creation of the EEC.  Were
the US to adopt such a proposal, then the EU might find it easier to move to
consolidated base taxation (and vice versa).  The second policy concerns an idea
presented by an American economist that reaches a compromise between the two
approaches.
Treating the European Union as a Single Country
For several decades, U.S. multinationals with operations in Europe have argued that
they should be able to treat the member states of the European Union, as it is now
known, as a single country for tax purposes.  The issue was first presented in the early
1960s when the Congress enacted the Subpart F rules.  Under these rules, when a
controlled foreign corporation (CFC) of a U.S. company sells goods to a related
person located in a different country from the CFC’s country of incorporation, that
income may be subject to current taxation under the general Subpart F foreign base
company sales income rules.
19
While the general purpose of the Subpart F rules was to limit deferral of US taxes for
certain types of income, the specific purpose of this portion of the rules was to restrict
the ability of CFCs to reduce their overall tax liability by shifting income from high-
tax to low-tax jurisdictions through related party sales.  These rules were deemed
necessary, in part, as a support for the arm’s length transfer pricing system.
20  There
was a concern about the potential abuse that could occur if CFCs were in a position to
take advantage of the differences in foreign tax systems and artificially shift their
income to related parties located in tax havens.
While the need to curb “tax haven abuse” was recognized, some believed that certain
exceptions should be made to that rule. Thus, an amendment was introduced to the
1962 bill that would have effectively treated the European Economic Community as a
single country for purposes of the foreign base company sales and services rules.
Under this proposal, the controlled foreign corporation (CFC) of US companies
selling products to related companies located in different member countries of the
then six-member EEC would not be subject to the subpart F rules because their
operations would be deemed to have occurred within the country where the CFC was
                                                
19   A controlled foreign corporation is generally any foreign corporation of which more than 50% of its
stock by vote or value is owned, directly, indirectly, or constructively, by U.S. shareholders.  Under
Subpart F, 10 percent or more U.S. shareholders must include currently in their gross income items of
the CFC’s income that are defined as Subpart F income.  Certain exceptions apply to these rules, such
as if the income is subject to a high foreign tax rate or if the income qualifies for the manufacturing
exception.  Subpart F is contained in Sections 951- 964 of the Internal Revenue Code.  This discussion
of subpart F is necessarily brief and incomplete.  For details, see US Treasury, The deferral of income
through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations, A Policy Study, December 2000.
20  These rules, which encompass the arm’s length standard, are contained in Section 482 of the Internal
Revenue Code.Page 13
incorporated.  The reason for this exception was to allow US businesses doing
business in the EEC to compete on a favorable footing with EEC companies, who
could operate their businesses on a European-wide basis.
The amendment was rejected for several reasons.  First, the members of the EEC
could not be considered as a single economy as several economic barriers existed
among the members.  Second each member state continued to operate its own
company tax regime with corporate tax rates varying substantially within the EEC.
With this cross-border tax rate variations, CFCs would be able to engage in tax-
avoidance strategies by shifting income to low-tax member states.
21  Therefore, the
Congress concluded that the EEC should not be considered as a single country for
purposes of gaining an exemption to the subpart F regime.
As these exceptions were not granted  and since the  income of the foreign
subsidiaries of many US companies doing business in the EU continued to be subject
to subpart F, US businesses restructured their EU operations so as to avoid the subpart
F rules.  However, even though US businesses are able to set up a tax optimal
structure, they argue that such a situation does not represent an efficient business
structure since the sole reason for this structure is to avoid imposition of the subpart F
rules.  Moreover, US businesses continue, as the EU is now operating as a Single
Market, the subpart F rules for related party sales should no longer apply and their EU
operations should qualify for the single country exception to subpart F.
22 
Despite these arguments, the U.S. Treasury has regularly objected to the proposal
since the EU (or EEC) could not yet be considered to operate as a single market.
Treasury argued that the member states of the EU were no more integrated than any
other group of countries; thus, there was no reason to grant an exception to the subpart
F rules for US companies doing business in the EU.
23
It has been noted, however, that if the EU were to operate as a single country, then the
US might be more likely to consider treating the EU as a single country for purposes
of subpart F.  With the Commission considering changes to EU company tax systems
that would allow EU businesses to consolidate their tax bases for their EU-wide
activities, EU businesses might be able to garner the support of US businesses in
achieving this goal.
                                                
21   See US Treasury Policy Study, pp. 114-15.
22  See Section 206 of S. 2086.
23 Given failure to enact any of these bills, the most recent incarnation of the idea to treat the EU as a
Single Country took a different approach in 1999.  At that time, the U.S. Congress considered a bill
(the Financial Freedom Act of 1999) that would require the U.S. Treasury Department to study the
feasibility of treating all EU member states as a single country for purposes of the same country
exception to the Subpart F rules.  This bill was not enacted.Page 14
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